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GENERAL FRANCO AS MILITARY LEADER 
By Paul Preston 
READ 22 JANUARY 1993 AT THE UNIVERSITY OF WALES COLLEGE OF CARDIFF 
BOTH during his lifetime, and after his death, General Franco was 
reviled by his enemies on the left and subjected to the most absurd 
adulation by his admirers on the right. As the victor in a bloody civil 
war which inflamed passions throughout the world, that is hardly 
surprising. Leaving aside his personal political success in remaining in 
power for nearly four decades, his victory in the Spanish Civil War 
was his greatest and most glorious achievement, something reflected in 
the judgements of detractors and hagiographers alike. For the left, 
Franco the general was a slow-witted mediocrity whose battlefield 
triumphs were owed entirely to the unstinting military assistance of 
Hitler and Mussolini. For the right, Franco the general was the 
twentieth-century incarnation of Alexander the Great, of Napoleon and 
of the great warrior hero of Spanish legend, El Cid. 
Beyond the propagandistic excesses of the Caudillo's wilder syco- 
phants, however, what is altogether more remarkable is that both his 
wartime allies and the most sober judges from his own side have 
concurred in a generally critical view of his prowess as a military leader. 
The views of both Fuihrer and Duce, for instance, could barely have 
been more hostile. Hitler commented at a dinner in 1942, 'Franco and 
company can consider themselves very lucky to have received the help 
of Fascist Italy and National Socialist Germany in their first civil war 
... The intervention of the German General von Richthofen and the 
bombs his squadrons rained from the heavens decided the issue'.' 
During the Civil War, Hitler's first diplomatic envoy General Wilhelm 
Faupel was frequently scathing in his dispatches about the painful 
slowness of Franco's military leadership.2 The Italians were equally 
critical. In December 1937, outraged at Franco's apparent inability to 
press home the advantage of his superior forces, the Italian Foreign 
Minister Count Ciano wrote in his diary 'Franco has no idea of 
synthesis in war.'3 During the battle of the Ebro in 1938, the Duce 
himself protested about Franco's 'flabby conduct of the war', telling 
Ciano, 'Put on record in your diary that today, 29 August, I prophesy 
'[Adolf Hitler], Hitler's Table Talk 1941-1944 (1953), 569. 
'See, for instance, Documents onGerman Foreign Policy Series D, III (1951), 408-10. 
3Galeazzo Ciano, Ciano's Diary 1937-1938 (1952), 46. 
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the defeat of Franco. Either the man doesn't know how to make war 
or he doesn't want to. The reds are fighters, Franco is not.'4 
The views of Franco's German and Italian allies might be dismissed 
as ill-founded on the grounds of distance and lack of familiarity with 
Spanish conditions. However, equally negative, albeit more cautiously 
expressed, criticisms came from within the Generalisimo's own military 
establishment. Two such assessments of Franco as strategist emanated 
from the heart of the Nationalist high command-General Alfredo 
Kindelhn Duany, the Chief of Franco's Air Force, and Colonel (later 
General) Jorge Vig6n Suerodiaz, Chief of Staff irst o the Army of the 
North and then to Franco himself. During the early stages of the war, 
Vig6n wrote several etters to KindelAn, urging him to use his influence 
with the Generalisimo to bring about a change of strategy and an 
acceleration of operations. Kindelan wrote memoirs in the immediate 
aftermath of the war in which he revealed his own and Vig6n's 
reservations about Franco's overall conduct of the war. Permission for 
their publication was withheld until 1945 and even then the criticisms 
of Franco as a strategist were cut from the text and not restored until 
the second edition which was published seven years after the Caudillo's 
death. 
In relation, for example, to Franco's failure to seize the opportunity 
opened up by the fall of Bilbao in July 1937 for a rapid sweep through 
the north, Kindelan wrote: 'the enemy was defeated but was not 
pursued; the success was not exploited, the withdrawal was not turned 
into a disaster. This was due to the fact that while the tactical conception fthe 
operation was masterly, as was its execution, the strategic conception on the other 
hand was much more modest.' The italicised passage was suppressed along 
with many others.5 In his own diaries, not published until 1970, it is 
possible to discern Vig6n's frustration with those of Franco's military 
decisions which delayed major advances.6 Subsequently, the Francoist 
army's most distinguished official historians have also been discreetly 
critical of their Commander-in-Chief.7 
What all these criticisms, whether German, Italian or Spanish, have 
in common is the belief that Franco could have speeded up the progress 
4Ciano, Diay 37-38, I48. 
5Compare Alfredo Kindelan, Mis cuadernos de guerra 1936-1939 (Madrid, n.d. [1945], 
86 and Mis cuadernos de guerra 1936-1939 2" edici6n (Barcelona, 1982), 9, 127. All subsequent 
references are to the 2nd edition. 
6Jorge Vig6n Suerodiaz, Cuadernos de guerray notas de paz (Oviedo, 197), 49-50, 212. 
7It is remarkable, for instance, that Franco is a shadowy figure in the seventeen- 
volume set of Monografias de la guerra de EspaAa produced by the Spanish Army's Servicio 
Hist6rico Militar under the direction of Colonel Jose Manuel Martinez Bande, (Madrid, 
1968-1985). See also the critical comments on Franco's generalship to be found throughout 
Generals Ram6n & Jeslus Salas LarrazAbal, Historia general de la guerra de Espaffa (Madrid, 
1987). 
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of his war effort at several crucial moments. The basis of this view was 
Franco's dilatory decision-making style in general and his readiness, at 
Brunete and Teruel in 1937 and at the Ebro in 1938, to divert large 
numbers of troops to the strategically meaningless and usually costly 
task of recovering territory captured by the Republic in diversionary 
attacks. The Generalisimo's apparent propensity to lose sight of major 
strategic goals on these occasions, together with his readiness to ignore 
several opportunities to conquer a poorly defended Catalonia, has led 
to the conclusion that he was lacking in vision. Certainly, it cannot be 
denied that, as his one-time superior officer, General Jose Sanjurjo, 
commented in 1931 'he is no Napoleon'.8 It is probably an under- 
statement o suggest, with Hitler and Mussolini, with Kindelin and 
Vig6n, that he was deficient as a military strategist. However, it is the 
contention of this paper that to judge Franco in terms of his capacity 
to elaborate elegant and incisive strategy is to miss the point. He won 
the Spanish Civil War in the way in which he wanted to win it and in 
the time within which he wanted to win it. Most importantly of all, he 
derived from his victory that which he most wanted, the political power 
to remake Spain in his own image, unimpeded either by enemies on 
the left or rivals on the right. 
In both form and content, Franco's strategy pursued a long-term 
political agenda rather than immediate battlefield objectives. That this 
should have been the case derives in part from a personality in which 
instinctive caution coexisted with almost unlimited ambition. Even 
more crucial was his military education and training between I907 and 
19io at the antiquated Infantry Academy in Toledo and his formative 
experiences in Spain's savage colonial wars in Morocco. In one import- 
ant respect, his personal experiences and the ethos of the Toledo 
Academy were to come together and determine the central plank of 
Franco's military style during the Spanish Civil War. Deeply traumatised 
as a child by the infidelities of his pleasure-loving and free-thinking 
father, he identified with his pious and conservative mother. Throughout 
his life, he would reject all those things which he associated with his 
father, from sexual dalliance and alcoholic drink to the ideas of the 
left. His childhood coincided with the lowest ebb of Spain's political 
fortunes, and, over time, he came to associate his personal difficulties 
with those of his country. In 1898, Spain suffered humiliating defeat at 
the hands of the United States and lost the last remnants of her empire. 
When the fourteen-year-old Franco entered the military academy in 
1907, he found an atmosphere of fetid hostility to liberal politicians 
who were held responsible for the imperial disaster of 1898. Throughout 
8In a conversation with the Minister of War, Manuel Azafia, on 20o July 1931- Manuel Azafia, Obras completas 4 vols (Mexico D.E, 1966-1968), IV, 35- 
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his life, he would blame his nation's disasters on men who were 
uncannily like his father.9 During the Civil War, his objective was not 
speedy victory but the long-term eradication from Spain of such men 
and their influence. 
The Infantry Academy taught Franco little by way of contemporary 
strategic thinking or of technological developments in warfare since the 
Franco-Prussian war. No lessons were drawn from the guerrilla struggle 
in Cuba. The emphasis was on rigid discipline, an idealised military 
history of Spain's past glories and a set of moral virtues of which 
unthinking bravery and unquestioning obedience were the highest. 
Spain's current international difficulties were blamed on the poisons of 
liberalism and leftism. By way of compensation for the battlefield 
failures of the military, great stress was placed on the army's position 
as moral and political guardian of the nation. It was axiomatic that the 
army had the right to rise up against any government which tolerated 
either social disorder or the activities of the regional autonomy move- 
ments which challenged national unity. Franco left the Academy with 
little applicable military science but thoroughly imbued with these 
assumptions."' 
In practical terms, the formative experience for Franco the soldier 
was as a junior officer in Spain's Moroccan protectorate. Arriving in 
Morocco in 1912, he spent ten and a half of the next fourteen years 
there and learnt much about warfare against hostile civilians. As he 
told the journalist Manuel Aznar in 1938, 'My years in Africa live 
within me with indescribable force. There was born the possibility of 
rescuing a great Spain. There was founded the idea which today 
redeems us. Without Africa, I can scarcely explain myself to myself, 
nor can I explain myself properly to my comrades in arms."' By dint 
of cold-blooded bravery and an assiduous attention to the detail of 
logistics and map-making, he began his meteoric rise through the ranks 
which would take him from Second Lieutenant in I912 to Brigadier 
General a mere fourteen years later. A war concerned with the 
pacification of bitterly hostile warrior tribes could hardly have been 
more brutal. However, the savagery of the occupying forces reached 
new heights in August 1920 with the formation of the Spanish Foreign 
Legion or Tercio de Extranjeros, a mercenary force in which Franco would 
serve as second-in-command. As a matter of policy, the Legion would 
commit atrocities against the Moorish villages which they attacked. 
90On the relationship between Franco's personal life and his political ideas, see Paul 
Preston, Franco: A Biography (1993), 3-9, 72. 
'"On Franco's time at the Toledo Academy, see Preston, Franco, 8-13. 
"'Declaraciones de S.E. a Manuel Aznar', 31 December 1938, Palabras del Caudillo 19 
abril 1937--31 diciembre 1938 (Barcelona, 1939), 314. 
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The decapitation of prisoners and the exhibition of severed heads as 
trophies was common." Franco encouraged the brutal violence of his 
men in the knowledge that their grim reputation was itself a useful 
weapon in terrorising the colonial population. 
By the time that Franco returned to the Peninsula in 1926, he had 
fully developed two of the central features of his war effort during the 
three years of Civil War-an unflinching ruthlessness in the use of 
terror against civilian populations and an unwavering belief in the 
army's right to impose its political views. By 1936, he would also have 
acquired the conviction that he was the best person to define those 
views. His growing belief to his own patriotic mission was confirmed 
by his period from December 1927 to June 1931 as director of the 
Academia General Militar in Zaragoza. There, assisted by a staff 
chosen from among his Africanista comrades, he educated a generation 
of officers, who would fight by his side during the Civil War, in the 
brutal arrogance of the Foreign Legion and the idea of the army's right 
to determine the nation's political destinies.'3 
The coming of the democratic Second Republic in 1931 was some- 
thing of a set-back for Franco. To his intense chagrin, the Zaragoza 
Academy was closed and he was left for eight months without a posting 
until, in February 1932, he was made military governor of La Corufia. 
Neither that posting, nor his promotion one year later to be military 
commander of the Balearic Islands, diminished his hostility to the 
democratic regime. His fortunes changed, however, with the coming 
to power of the increasingly conservative Radical Party backed by the 
votes of the Catholic authoritarian party, the Confederaci6n Espafiola 
de Derechas Aut6nomas (CEDA). The Radical Minister of War, Diego 
Hidalgo, not only promoted him to Major General but also chose to 
use him as his unofficial personal adviser on military matters. In 
October 1934, convinced that fascism was about to be imposed in 
Spain, the workers of the northern mining districts of Asturias rose in 
protest at the entry of the CEDA into the government. Diego Hidalgo 
informally placed Franco in charge of the repression of the uprising. 
The declaration of martial aw effectively transferred tothe Ministry of 
War the responsibilities for law and order normally under the jur- 
isdiction of the Ministry of the Interior. Diego Hidalgo's total reliance 
on Franco effectively gave him control of the functions of both 
"Jose Martin Blizquez, I Helped to Build an Amnny: Civil War Memoirs of a Spanish Staff 
Officer (1939), 302; Herbert R. Southworth, Antifalange: estudio critico de < Falange en la guerra 
de Esparia: la Unficaci6n y Hedilla> de Maximiano Garcia Venero (Paris, 1967), xxxi-xxii; 
Guillermo Cabanellas, La guerra de los mil dias, 2 vols, (Buenos Aires, 1973), II, 792. 
'30 On Franco's time at the Zaragoza Academy, see Carlos Blanco Escola, La Academia 
General Militar de Zaragoza (1928-1931) (Barcelona, 1989) passim; Preston, Franco, 56-61. 
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Ministries, a control which he exercised with notable ruthlessness.'4 It 
was an intoxicating and addictive taste of real politico-military power for 
Franco, confirmation fthe central ideas on the role of the military in 
politics which he had absorbed as a cadet in the Toledo Academy. It was 
a profoundly formative experience, deepening his messianic onviction 
that he was born to rule and to command Spain's armed forces in the 
battle against the pernicious ideologies of liberalism and the left. 
Despite such inflated views of his own importance, Franco was slow 
to commit himself to the military uprising plotted in the course of the 
spring and early summer of 1936. When he finally did so, a mere five 
days before the Civil War broke out, it was to take over the most 
efficacious units on the rebel side-the Spanish Moroccan Army. He 
found a depressing situation when he flew into Morocco from the 
Canary Islands where he had been military commander since March. 
The Moroccan Army was trapped on the wrong side of the Straits of 
Gibraltar, blockaded by the Spanish fleet whose crews had mutinied 
against their right-wing officers and declared for the Republic. In 
response to this daunting problem, Franco displayed what were probably 
his most valuable and inspirational qualities as a military leader--his 
glacial sangfroid under pressure, his unshakeable resolve and his infec- 
tious optimism. In speeches, harangues and broadcasts, he repeated his 
catch-phrase 'blind faith in victory' and his mere presence with the 
rebels was a boost to their morale.'5 
Franco's optimism and his ruthless determination to win were 
reflected in an historic interview which he gave to the American 
reporter Jay Allen in Tetuain on 27 July. Asked how long the killing 
would continue now that the coup had failed, Franco replied 'there 
can be no compromise, no truce. I shall go on preparing my advance 
to Madrid. I shall advance. I shall take the capital. I shall save Spain 
from marxism at whatever cost ... Shortly, very shortly, my troops will 
have pacified the country and all of this will soon seem like a nightmare.' 
When Allen responded 'that means that you will have to shoot half 
Spain?', a smiling Franco said 'I repeat, at whatever cost."6 
In the meanwhile, he had to resolve the problem of the Republican 
'4Diego Hidalgo Durain, gPor quL fui lanzado del Ministerio de la Guerra? Diez meses de 
actuacidn ministerial (Madrid, 1934), 79-81; Manuel Ballb6, Orden piblico y militarismo en la 
Espaffa constitucional (1812-1983) (Madrid, 1983), 371-2; General L6pez Ochoa, Campafia 
militar de Asturias en octubre de 1934 (Narraciin tdctico-episddica) (Madrid, 1936), I1-12, 26-9; 
Jose Maria Gil Robles, Nofue posible la paz (Barcelona, 1968), 140o-I; CesarJal6n, Memorias 
politicas: periodista. ministro. presidiario. (Madrid, 1973), 128-31;Juan-Sime6n Vidarte, El bienio 
negroy la insurreccidn de Asturias (Barcelona, 1978), 358-9. 
'5Joaquin Arraras, Historia de la Cruzada espaiola, 8 vols, 36 tomos, (Madrid, I939-43, 
III, 80-2; Francisco Franco Salgado-Araujo, Mi vidajunto a Franco (Barcelona, 1977), 165; 
Jose Antonio Vaca de Osma, Paisajes con Franco alfondo (Barcelona, 1987), 35-6. 
'6News Chronicle, 29 July, I August 1936. 
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blockade. He examined both the then revolutionary idea of getting his 
army across the Straits by air and, despite advice to the contrary from 
his staff, the bold notion of a convoy to break through the blockade.'7 
He believed contemptuously that the Republican sailors, without rained 
officers to navigate, oversee the engine rooms or direct he guns, would 
present little danger. The crossing on 5 August was an audacious risk 
which consolidated his standing on the Nationalist side. In the mean- 
while, the few aircraft at his disposal ceaselessly carried troops across 
the Straits. This was converted into a full-scale airlift when both Hitler 
and Mussolini separately decided to help the Spanish Nationalists. 
Their decisions to do so were ultimately determined by considerations 
of their own interests. However, that they should both decide to target 
their assistance on Franco was a reflection ot only of his manifest 
efficacy but also of the force of conviction with which he persuaded 
the representatives of both Fascist Italy and the Nazi Auslandorganization 
that he was the rebel to back. His rivals, General Emilio Mola in the 
north and General Gonzalo Queipo de Llano in the south could not 
match Franco's ability to secure foreign backing.'8 
Once he had his troops in Southern Spain, Franco's first operations 
drew on his experiences in Africa. The terrain, the arid scrublands of 
Andalusia, and the fact that his opponents were poorly armed civilians, 
recalled the colonial wars. Franco had already demonstrated his readi- 
ness to use Moroccan mercenaries in mainland Spain in October 1934- 
From early August, his African columns set out from Seville, initially 
making rapid progress on the first step of a hard-fought journey to 
Madrid. With Franco's knowledge and permission, the Legion and the 
Moroccan mercenaries of the Regulares Indigenas (indigenous regulars) 
functioned with terrible efficacy during their advance. Franco conducted 
the early stages of his war effort against the Spanish left as if it were a 
colonial war against a racially contemptible enemy. The Moors and 
Legionaries pread terror wherever they went, looted the villages they 
captured, raped the women they found, killed their prisoners and 
sexually mutilated the corpses.'9 The use of terror, both immediate and 
'7Kindelin's on claimed that the ideas both for the airlift and for a blockade-breaking 
convoy emanated from his father, 'Pr61ogo', Kindelin, Mis cuadernos, 45.
'8 On Franco's role in securing Italian and German aid, see Renzo de Felice, Mussolini 
ii duce: lo stato totalitario 1936-194o (Turin, 1981), 363; John F. Coverdale, Italian Intervention 
in the Spanish Civil War, (Princeton, 1975), 69-74; Ismael Saz Campos, Mussolini contra l H 
Repziblica: hostilidad, conspiraciones, intervenci6n (1931-i936) (Valencia, 1986), 181-5; Angel 
Vifias, La Alemania naziy el I8 dejulio 2' edici6n (Madrid, 1977), 264-342. 
'9 The Times, 26 August 1926; John Whitaker, 'Prelude to World War: A Witness from 
Spain', Foreign Affairs, XXI, I, October 1942, 105-6; Maria Rosa de Madariaga, 'Imagen 
del moro en la memoria colectiva del pueblo espafiol y retorno del moro en la guerra 
civil de 1936', Revista Internacional de Sociologia XLVI, 4, October-December 1988, 590-6; 
Mijail Koltsov, Diario de la guerra de Espafta (Paris, 1963), 88-9. 
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as a long-term investment, was to be an essential part of Franco's 
repertoire both as a general and as a dictator. During, and long after 
the Civil War, those of his enemies not physically eliminated would be 
broken by terror and forced to seek survival in apathy. 
Under the overall field command of Lieutenant-Colonel Juan Yagtie, 
Franco's columns advanced out of the province of Seville and into 
Extremadura. They took town after town, advancing 200 kilometres in 
a little over a week. The accumulated terror generated after each minor 
victory, together with the skill of the African Army in open scrub, 
explains why Franco's troops were initially so successful. The scratch 
Republican militia would fight desperately so long as they enjoyed the 
cover of buildings or trees. However, even the rumoured threat of 
being outflanked by the Moors would send them fleeing, abandoning 
their equipment as they ran. Franco planned his operations accordingly. 
Intimidation and the use of terror, euphemistically described as castigo 
(punishment), were specified in written orders.2 The most extensive 
slaughter took place in the days following the capture of Badajoz on 
14 August, when two thousand prisoners were massacred. Franco's 
decision to turn back to Badajoz, a sixty kilometre detour for his 
columns, was typical of his obsession with the annihilation of all 
opposition, irrespective of the time lost or casualties incurred. If his 
forces had pressed on to Madrid, the Badajoz garrison could not 
seriously have threatened them from the rear. The decision contributed 
to the delay which allowed the Republic to organise its defences. 
Just three days earlier, on II August, Franco had written Mola a 
letter in which he revealed this obsession with the thorough purging of 
captured territory. It was a strategic vision which would not change 
substantially in the course of the war and one that was deeply imbued 
with an essentially 'colonial' mentality. He made it clear that, for him, 
the cumulative conquest of ground and the subsequent annihilation of 
all resistance in the 'occupied zones' meant more than rapid victory. 
Nonetheless, he agreed that the ultimate objective must be the capture 
of Madrid. Significantly, noting that the fortress of the Alcazar in 
Toledo was besieged by Republican militiamen, he commented that 
the advance of his troops on the capital would 'take the pressure off 
and relieve Toledo without diverting forces which might be needed'." 
After the capture of Badajoz, the African columns advanced rapidly 
up the roads to the north east in the direction of the capital. On 27 
August, they reached the last town of importance on the way to Madrid, 
o"Jose Manuel Martinez Bande, La marcha sobre Madrid (Madrid, 1968), i65-7o. 
"Jose Manuel Martinez Bande, 'Del alzamiento a la guerra civil verano de 1936: 
correspondencia Franco/Mola', Historiay uVida, 
XCIII, 1975, 22-3- 
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Talavera de la Reina, which fell one week later." Another savage and 
systematic massacre ensued. The main road to Madrid was now open 
and Franco took it. However, in the light of subsequent decisions to be 
discussed below, there is room for speculation that Franco was not 
especially interested in an early capture of Madrid. With resistance 
intensifying, his troops took more than fifteen days to reach the town 
of Maqueda, where the road divided to go either north-east to Madrid 
or south-east o Toledo.23 
Maqueda fell to Yagtie on 21 September and from that moment on, 
the nature of Franco's war altered dramatically. Earlier in the month, 
the Republic had reorganised its government under the leadership of 
the Socialist Francisco Largo Caballero. That move towards central 
authority increased a feeling among the Nationalist commanders that 
they too needed a unified command. Franco had long since expressed 
ambitions in that direction, telling the Germans in Morocco that he 
wanted to be seen 'not only as the saviour of Spain but also as the 
saviour of Europe from the spread of Communism'.24 That was not 
something which could be achieved by means of a swift military victory 
over the Republic and a subsequent armistice. Franco's long-term 
political ambitions and immediate military decisions came together in 
a remarkable fashion in the immediate aftermath of Yagtie's capture of 
Maqueda. On the same day, at a meeting of the senior rebel generals 
held at an airfield near Salamanca, Franco was elected Generalisimo 
of the Nationalist forces by his comrades-in-arms. However, behind a 
near-unanimous vote and rhetoric of support, there was a discernible 
reluctance. Three days passed and nothing was done about publicising 
or implementing the decision to name Franco Generalisimo. Accord- 
ingly, Franco sought a way of clinching their support. 
This took the form of the strategically bizarre decision to divert his 
troops away from Madrid towards Toledo. He thereby lost an unre- 
peatable opportunity to reach the capital while it was poorly defended 
and demoralised. Yague, Kindelin and Franco's Chief of Operations, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Antonio Barroso, all warned him that a diversion 
to relieve the Alcazar would cost him Madrid. He later admitted that 
'we committed a military error and we committed it deliberately'.25 
Franco was choosing to give a higher priority to the inflation of 
his own political position by securing the emotional victory and 
propagandistic coup of the liberation of the Alcizar on 27 September. 
" Martinez Bande, La marcha sobre Madrid, 45-56. 
23Martinez Bande, La marcha sobre Madrid, 56-71; Ram6n Garriga, El general Juan Yagie 
(Barcelona, 1985), 111-12. 
'4Documents onGerman Foreign Policy, D, III, 28. 
"5 Armando Boaventura, Madrid-Moscovo de ditadura ai Repuiblica e i guerra civil de Espanha 
(Lisbon, 1937), 212. 
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On the following day, the Nationalist high command met again at the 
airfield near Salamanca and Franco was both confirmed atGeneralisimo 
and elected as 'Head of the Government of the Spanish State'. 
Thereafter, he simply arrogated to himself the powers of the Headship 
of State."6 As a consequence of his decision, there was a delay between 
the fall of Maqueda on 21 September and 7 October, when the advance 
on Madrid was renewed. 
From the moment of his political elevation, the rhythm and style of 
Franco's war effort changed. The lightning war of the columns now gave 
way to a far more deliberate process wherein the gradual destruction of 
the enemy took precedence over grand strategic objectives. In line with 
his grandiose plans for permanently eradicating the left from Spain, 
Franco began to prolong the war both in order to crush his Republican 
enemies and to eliminate his rivals on the right. Visiting the ruins of 
the Alcazar after the Civil War, Franco said to the official historian of 
his military triumphs, Manuel Aznar, 'When I entered the Alcizar, I 
was convinced that I had won the war. From then on it was just a 
question of time. I was no longer interested in a lightning victory but 
in a total victory, on every front, as a result of the exhaustion of the 
enemy.'27 
On 7 October, the Nationalist forces tentatively resumed operations 
against Madrid. After frequent consultations with Franco, Mola had 
developed a two-part final strategy to take the capital which was already 
surrounded on the west from due north to due south. The idea was 
first for Nationalist forces to reduce the semi-circle by closing in on the 
capital, and then for the Army of Africa, now under the command of 
the impetuous General Varela, to make a frontal assault through the 
north western suburbs. The forward efences of the city were demoral- 
ised by Nationalist bombing and then brushed aside by motorised 
columns armed with fast Italian 'whippet' tanks.'8 However, there was 
little real urgency about the attack and Franco himself was curiously 
absent from the front until 23 November when he came to order the 
cessation of the attack. He was altogether more concerned with the less 
important battle to relieve the Asturian capital Oviedo, for which he 
sent valuable troops from the Madrid front. However, when Barroso 
suggested that the Nationalist forces were insufficient to justify the risks 
involved in attacking a city which could be defended street by street 
and house by house, Franco replied 'let Varela have a go. He has 
always been lucky.' Such frivolity suggests that Franco was distancing 
26On the machinations behind the political elevation of Franco, see Preston, Franco, 
174-85- 
"7Jos6 Antonio Vaca de Osma, La larga guerra de Francisco Franco (Madrid, I991), 209. 
28Martinez Bande, La marcha, 81-95. 
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himself rom the attack on Madrid. Varela's plan to attack the northern 
suburbs, a natural fortress girded by the River Manzanares, was suicidal. 
There were acrimonious debates within the Nationalist high command 
over the wisdom of an uphill advance through narrow streets, yet 
Franco ultimately did nothing to prevent Varela's attack. The Gen- 
eralisimo could not call off the attack on Madrid when there was 
widespread conviction in the Nationalist ranks that the capital was 
about to fall. However, if Varela were to fail, there could be no 
opposition to his preference for a long war.29 
By 22 November, the people of Madrid, assisted by the International 
Brigades, defending the city with their backs to its walls, had repulsed 
the Nationalist attack.3" On the following day, Franco travelled from 
Salamanca to Leganes on the outskirts of Madrid and informed his 
generals that there was no choice but to abandon the attack. He was 
fortunate that the Republican forces in the capital were too exhausted 
to mount an immediate counter-offensive. If they had, the tide might 
well have turned decisively in their favour. Before the Republic could 
rally its forces, Franco's battered columns would receive massive 
reinforcements from Fascist Italy. Mussolini harboured increasing 
doubts about the Generalisimo's strategic vision but he was already too 
committed to the Nationalist cause to permit Franco to be defeated.3' 
The Germans were also 'faced with the decision either to leave Spain 
to herself or to throw in additional forces.'3 This was a situation which 
Franco would exploit with some skill. 
The failure of the assault on Madrid left Franco indecisive in the 
face of a complex war of manoeuvre. In the judgement of General 
Faupel, 'his military training and experience do not fit him for the 
direction of operations on their present scale.'33 Eventually, after con- 
siderable hesitation, he moved forward from the deadlock by adopting 
an encircling strategy against the Madrid-La Corufia road to the North 
West.1 In appalling weather, bloody battles were fought for small 
villages. The Italian commander in Spain, General Mario Roatta, also 
complained to Rome that the Generalisimo's staff was incapable of 
29Vaca de Osma, La larga guerra, 233-4; George Hills, Franco: The Man and his Nation 
(New York, 1967), 263. 
3"Vicente Rojo, Asi fre la defensa de Madrid (Mexico D.E, 1967), 55-ro3; Robert F. 
Colodny, The Struggle forMadrid (New York, 1958), 52-91; Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil 
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3'Documents on German Foreign Policy, D III, 139; Fascistas enEspafia: laintervencidn italiana 
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1936-31 marzo 1937), Ismael Saz &Javier Tusell, eds, (Madrid/Rome, 1981), 25. (Henceforth MMIS.) 
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mounting an operation appropriate to a large-scale war.35 When the 
fronts had stabilised by 15 January, each side had lost about I5,000 
men.36 The various efforts to take Madrid had severely depleted Franco's 
forces. The Republicans were now solidly dug in and Franco was 
doubly fortunate that they were unable to launch a counter-attack to
break through his severely overstretched lines and that substantial 
reinforcements would soon arrive from Italy. 
Partly out of contempt for Franco's generalship and partly out of a 
desire to monopolise the anticipated triumph for Fascism, Mussolini 
insisted that Italian troops must be used as an independent force 
under an Italian general only nominally responsible to Franco's overall 
command. Rejecting the Duce's more ambitious plans to cut off 
Catalonia from the rest of Spain, Franco agreed to an assault on 
Malaga to provide a seaport nearer to Italy and a launching pad for 
an attack on Valencia from the south west.37 Mussolini considered that 
he could send instructions toFranco as to a subordinate and the attack 
on Malaga seems to have been his personal idea."8 Franco was not 
much interested in the Italian tactic of guerra celere (lightning war) and 
the possibility of victories for Mussolini which might end the war before 
his own leadership was consolidated. He visited the southern front only 
once and was furious that Italian troops were first o enter Malaga and 
mortified by a telegram from Roatta which read 'Troops under my 
command have the honour to hand over the city of Malaga to 
Your Excellency'.39 In fact, given the massive numerical and logistical 
superiority of the attackers, the triumph was less of an achievement 
than it seemed at the time. 
While the Italians attacked in the south, and heartened by the 
availability of the crack German Condor Legion, Franco had renewed 
his efforts o take Madrid, launching on 6 February 1937 a major attack 
through the Jarama valley towards the Madrid-Valencia highway to 
the east of the capital. Still convinced that he could capture the capital, 
Franco took a special interest in the Jarama campaign.40 However, 
when Colonel Emilio Faldella, Roatta's Chief of Staff, offered the 
Generalisimo the opportunity to use the Italian forces to close the circle 
around Madrid, he responded negatively: 'This is a war of a special 
kind, that has to be fought with exceptional methods o that such a 
numerous mass cannot be used all at once, but spread out over several 
35MMIS, Telegramas, 79.
36 Carlos de Arce, Los generales deFranco (Barcelona, 1984) 186; Martinez Bande, La lucha 
en torno a Madrid, 51-69. 
37De Felice, Mussolini ilDuce, 389-90. 
38Mussolini to Roatta, 18 December 1936, MMIS, Telegramas, 69.
39Roatta to Ufficio Spagna, 8 February 1937, MMIS, Telegramas, 130. 
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fronts it would be more useful.'4' He thereby revealed not just his 
resentment of the victory at Malaga, but also the narrowness of his 
own strategic vision. His preference for piecemeal actions over a wide 
area reflected both his own practical military experiences in a small- 
scale colonial war and his desire to conquer Spain slowly and so 
consolidate his political supremacy.4' Franco would not be shaken from 
his preference for the gradual and thorough occupation of Republican 
territory, telling Faldella: 'In a civil war, a systematic occupation of 
territory accompanied by the necessary purge (limpieza) is preferable to 
a rapid rout of the enemy armies which leaves the country still infested 
with enemies'.43 
However, when the Nationalist attack in the Jarama was blunted by 
the determined resistance of Republican troops reinforced by the 
International Brigades, Franco was forced to eat his words and beg 
Faldella for a diversion to relieve his exhausted forces. The Generalisimo 
perceived an Italian attack on Guadalajara, forty miles north-east of 
Madrid, to be an ideal way to divert Republican troops away from the 
Jarama. The Italians, however, were not thinking in terms of a 
supplementary action but rather of a bold and decisive initiative. The 
way in which Franco resolved in his own interests the contradiction 
between his own and the Italians' strategic onception was to reveal 
his political ruthlessness. More significantly, it was also to underline the 
extent o which he had gained in confidence and developed his notion 
of how the war should be fought since the de6bcle at Madrid had 
occasioned the contemptuous remarks of Faupel and Roatta. 
Anxious to get the Italians to relieve the pressure on his exhausted 
forces in the Jarama, on I March, Franco agreed to Faldella's proposal 
to close the circle around Madrid, with a joint attack south west by the 
Italians from Sigiuenza towards Guadalajara backed up by a north 
eastern push by Nationalist troops from the Jarama towards Alcala de 
Henares. On 8 March, the Italians under General Amerigo Coppi 
initially broke through the Republican defences. However, it became 
clear by the evening that Franco's promised attack from the Jarama 
had not materialised. The Republicans were thus permitted to withdraw 
forces from that front and concentrate reinforcements to the north of 
Guadalajara. The Italians were further disadvantaged by the weather. 
Equipped for African operations, they were unprepared for heavy snow 
and sleet. Their aircraft were grounded while the Republican air force 
41 Olao Conforti, Guadalajara: laprima sconfitta delfascismo (Milan, 1967), 30-2; Coverdale, 
Italian Intervention, 215. 
4'Cantalupo to Ciano, 17 February 1937, Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari 
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operated almost normally. Their light tanks with fixed machine guns 
were vulnerable to the Republic's Russian T-26 with revolving turret- 
mounted cannon. As Roatta desperately called for the promised sup- 
porting attack from the south, Franco feigned powerlessness. While he 
prevaricated before an apoplectic Roatta, the Italian forces were routed. 
The defeat of Guadalajara had many components-the weather, the 
poor morale and inappropriate equipment of the Italians and the skill 
of the Republican operations. Nevertheless, if Franco's attack had taken 
place as promised, the outcome might have been very different. The 
Generalisimo's refusal to commit his own troops and his readiness to 
let the Italians exhaust hemselves in a bloodbath with the Republicans 
makes it difficult to avoid the conclusion that he had decided to use 
the Italians as cannon fodder in his strategy of defeating the Republic 
by gradual attrition. He let the Italians bear the weight of the fighting 
while his own units regrouped."4 
Franco could take comfort from the fact that Guadalajara was a 
defeat which cost the Republic dearly in terms of casualties. However, 
it obliged him fundamentally to reconsider his strategic options. The 
unmistakable conclusion offered by the easy victory at Malaga and the 
bloodbaths at the Jarama and Guadalajara was that the Republic was 
concentrating its best units around the capital and neglecting other 
fronts. Accordingly, albeit reluctantly, Franco accepted the possibility of 
destroying the Republic by instalments far from the centre. Throughout 
March, Franco was subjected to pressure from Colonel Vig6n, Chief 
of Mola's General Staff, via Kindelin, and General Hugo Sperrle, 
commander of the German Condor Legion, to intensify the war in the 
north in order to seize the heavy industrial resources of the Basque 
provinces. It took Guadalajara to change Franco's mind.45 Franco made 
the decision with uncharacteristic rapidity, persuaded by promises from 
Sperrle and his Chief of Staff, Colonel Wolfram von Richthofen, about 
the likely impact of 'close air support' in smashing the morale of 
opposing troops.46 The Condor Legion was theoretically responsible 
directly to Franco." However, given the difficulties ofhour-by-hour 
liaison, Franco gave Sperrle a free hand to deal directly with Mola and 
Vig6n. Accordingly, with Franco's acquiescence, the Germans had the 
44On the battle of Guadalajara, see Preston, Franco, 229-37; MMIS, Telegrams, 161-83; 
Emilio Faldella, Venti mesi di guerra in Spagna (Florence, 1939), 255-66; Conforti, Guadalajara, 
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46Williamson Murray, German Militay Effectiveness (Baltimore, 1992), io4-5. 
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decisive voice in the campaign. While the advance was being planned, 
von Richthofen wrote in his diary, 'we are practically in charge of the 
entire business without any of the responsibility'.48 
Although Franco was delighted to bask in the sensation of having 
the Condor Legion at his orders, its novel use of ultra-modern tech- 
nology was some distance from his strategic world. Indeed, to the 
consternation of Sperrle, he weakened the Basque offensive (Bilbao did 
not fall until 19 June) by keeping substantial forces near Madrid and 
requested, unsuccessfully, that the Condor Legion be split up among 
his units in central Spain. Nevertheless, German ground attack methods, 
exemplified by atrocities uch as the bombing of undefended civilian 
targets like Durango on 31 March and Guernica on 26 April, fitted 
well with his notion of a war effort which would terrorise the enemy 
into defeat. 
He explained his thinking in this regard to the Italian Ambassador 
Roberto Cantalupo on 4 April 1937. He dismissed the idea of swift 
strategic strikes as appropriate only for war against a foreign enemy. 
Speaking of 'the cities and in the countryside which I have already 
occupied but which are still not redeemed', he declared ominously that 
'we must carry out the necessarily slow task of redemption and 
pacification, without which the military occupation will be largely 
useless. The moral redemption of the occupied zones will be long and 
difficult because in Spain the roots of anarchism are old and deep.' 
Redemption meant bloody political purges such as those which had 
followed the capture of Badajoz and Malaga: 'I will occupy Spain town 
by town, village by village, railway by railway ... Nothing will make 
me abandon this gradual programme. It will bring me less glory but 
greater internal peace. That being the case, this civil war could still ast 
another year, two, perhaps three. Dear ambassador, I can assure that 
I am not interested in territory but in inhabitants. The reconquest of 
the territory is the means, the redemption of the inhabitants the end.' 
With a tone of helpless regret, he went on, 'I cannot shorten the war 
by even one day ... It could even be dangerous for me to reach Madrid 
with a stylish military operation. I will take the capital not an hour 
before it is necessary: first I must have the certainty of being able to 
found a regime.'49 There can be no doubting that Franco placed the 
greatest important on the consolidation of his political power. That 
had been shown throughout September and October 1936 and it was 
48Wolfram von Richthofen, 'Spanien-Tagebuch', in Maier, Klaus A. Guernica 26.4.1937. 
Die deutsche Intervention in Spanien und der 'Fall Guernica' (Freiburg, 1975) diary entries for 24, 
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49Cantalupo to Mussolini, 29 March 1937, ASMAE, SFG, b.38, T.7o9/345; Roberto 
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to lead, concurrently with the Basque campaign, to his devoting 
considerable time, effort and cunning to creating a single party under 
his undisputed leadership.s0 
By the summer of I937, with the Basques defeated and a further 
assault about to be launched on Santander, Franco was confident of 
ultimate victory, though with a calender marked in years rather than 
months. His Axis allies, however, found it difficult to accept his long 
term view of the political benefits of a plodding war of attrition. This 
led to talk of a negotiated settlement, something which the Caudillo 
dismissed out of hand-he wanted a war to the death. Nonetheless, he 
moved with crab-like slowness and this enabled the Republican Chief 
of Staff, General Vicente Rojo, to try to halt the attack on the north 
by a diversionary attack on 6 July at the village of Brunete, in arid 
scrubland fifteen miles west of Madrid. As he was later to show at 
Teruel and the Ebro, Franco's notion of a war of moral redemption by 
terror did not permit him to give up an inch of once captured territory 
nor to turn aside from any opportunity to hammer home to Republican 
Spain the message of his invincibility-whatever the human cost. By 
responding to the attack at Brunete, Franco delayed the far more 
important campaign in the north because he believed that he could 
destroy large numbers of Republican troops on the Madrid front.5' 
Franco's decision to accept the challenge of Brunete has widely been 
considered a strategic error. In fact, it ensured that, in one of the 
bloodiest slogging matches of the war, the Republic, in delaying the 
fall of Santander only by about five weeks, would lose twenty thousand 
of its best troops, an objective on which Franco always placed the 
highest value.52 More remarkable than the decision to abandon the 
northern campaign in order to fight at Brunete was Franco's response 
to the success of his troops. General Varela was convinced that, with 
the Republican forces in disarray, he could take Madrid. Franco now 
had no interest either in the early capture of Madrid nor in risking his 
advance in the north and ordered a flabbergasted Varela to dig in.5" 
The collapse of Madrid would probably have ended the war. Franco, 
however, did not want victory until every square inch of Spain had 
50o On the process of the so-called unification of all right-wing parties under Franco, 
see Maximiano Garcia Venero, Falange en la guerra de Espaita: la Un~fcacidn y Hedilla (Paris, 
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been cleansed of leftists and liberals. 
The campaign in the north became something of a walk-over. On 
24 August 1937, two days before the fall of Santander, Rojo launched 
another diversionary offensive along a broad front westwards from 
Catalonia aimed at encircling Zaragoza. The small town of Belchite 
fell and Franco gave long consideration to a response. However, given 
the low strategic value of the ground lost and the likely impact on both 
Nationalist and Republican morale of delaying the attack on Asturias, 
this time he did not take the bait.54 Belchite hardly interrupted the 
Nationalist conquest of Asturias during September and October. In 
terms of control of industrial production and population, the balance 
of power had now shifted dramatically in the Generalisimo's favour. 
His lines shortened and his commitments diminished, Franco now had 
powerful and well-equipped army available for use in the centre and 
the east. 
After nearly two months reorganising his forces into six army corps, 
Franco hesitated over the direction of his next great offensive. After 
lengthy consideration of a great push through Arag6n and then either 
an attack on Valencia or else a sweep through Catalonia to cut off the 
Republic from the French frontier, he decided, in early December, to 
launch his next attack against Madrid.55 He hoped to complete the 
encirclement of the capital with a push towards Alcala de Henares. 
However, Rojo pre-empted the operation by another diversionary 
offensive on 15 December against the bleak city of Teruel in Arag6n. 
The Republican forces quickly captured one thousand square kilometres 
and, for the first time, entered an enemy-held provincial capital."6 
Franco abandoned his Guadalajara offensive despite the firm, not to 
say frantic, advice of his own staff and of the senior German and 
Italian officers to abandon Teruel. His goal of the total, humiliating 
annihilation of the Republic did not admit of allowing the enemy such 
successes. With Rojo having thrown everything into the Teruel offensive, 
the capture of Madrid was a realistic possibility but Franco was not 
inclined to end the war before he had thoroughly 'redeemed' more 
territory. In that sense, the attraction of confronting Rojo at Teruel 
was that it provided the opportunity to destroy a large body of the 
Republic's best forces.57 
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When Franco pulled troops towards Teruel, an outraged Ciano 
commented 'Our generals are restless, quite rightly. Franco has no idea 
of synthesis in war. His operations are those of a magnificent battalion 
commander. His objective is always ground, never the enemy. And he 
doesn't realise that it is by the destruction of the enemy that you win 
a war'.58 Ciano was wrong. Franco's obsession with 'ground' was a 
deliberate quest for great battles of attrition which could, and did, 
destroy vast numbers of the enemy's troops. Teruel would be just such 
a conflict. Conducted in freezing conditions and at enormous cost to 
both sides, the battle was eventually won by Franco's forces on 22 
February.59 The Republican army was shattered and the Nationalists 
were now poised to sweep through Arag6n at their leisure. Franco now 
had a twenty per cent advantage in terms of men and an overwhelming 
one in terms of aircraft, artillery and other equipment.6 The destruction 
of the best Republican units at Teruel made it the military turning 
point of the Civil War. The battle also coincided with a further step 
forward in the institutionalisation of Franco's political power, with the 
formation of his first government on 30 January 1938.6' 
The triumph at Teruel opened up vistas of uninterrupted victories 
against an exhausted Republic and, over the next five months, Franco 
made good use of his opportunities. His concern with the physical 
annihilation of the enemy precluded stylish strategic operations to finish 
off the Republic quickly. Nevertheless, he was now to show some skill 
in handling a large army of several hundreds of thousands of men 
across a huge front and should therefore be seen as more than the 
petty-minded battalion commander so often derided by Hitler and 
Faupel, Mussolini and Ciano. In early March, six army corps totalling 
200,000 men began an advance across a 260 kilometre wide front in 
the direction of the Ebro valley. The objective was to destroy more 
Republican forces and to reach the point where the River Segre, which 
ran north to south through eastern Catalonia, met the Ebro running 
west to east near LUrida. So spectacular was its success that, by 15 
March, Franco decided to push on to the sea and cut off Catalonia 
from Valencia and the central Republican zone. 
However, when LUrida fell on 4 April to Yagie, he along with 
Kindelmn, Vig6n 
and the new commander of the Condor Legion, 
General Hellmuth Volkmann, advocated the occupation of a badly 
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defended Catalonia. It seemed to be the moment to finish off the 
Republic."' If he had followed all this advice, Franco could probably 
have brought the war to a speedier conclusion. There were no significant 
Republican forces between Ikrida and Barcelona. The loss of Catalonia, 
with the Republic's remaining war industry and the seat of government, 
would be a devastating blow to Republican morale. Franco rejected 
such a move partly because of fears of French intervention on behalf 
of the Republic.' However, he seems to have been motivated rather 
more by concern than a sudden Republican collapse in the wake of 
the fall of Barcelona would still have left a substantial number of armed 
Republicans in central and southern Spain. His goal remained the total 
annihilation of the Republic and its supporters. Accordingly, to the 
astonishment of Rojo as well as of Yagtie, Kindeln and Vig6n, he 
decided to divert his troops south for an attack on Valencia. He 
wanted further destruction a d demoralisation of the Republic's human 
resources before the war was over.64 
After eaching the Mediterranean on 15 April 1938, Franco's forces 
set off on a slow and bloody advance towards Valencia through the 
difficult terrain of the Maestrazgo. Kindelhn begged Franco to desist 
from an operation which was incurring high casualties for the National- 
ists as well as for the Republicans but he refused.65 By 23 July 1938, 
however, his forces were less than forty kilometres from Valencia. In 
an attempt to restore contact between Catalonia and the rest of the 
Republican zone, a desperate diversionary assault across the River 
Ebro was launched by General Rojo on 24 July. With the advantage 
of surprise, by I August, the Republicans had advanced forty kilometres 
to Gandesa. Although his staff were dismayed by the Ebro crossing, 
Franco himself welcomed the opportunity to encircle the Republicans 
with their backs to the river. He poured troops into the area and began 
a merciless four-month battle of attrition in order, at no little cost in 
Nationalist lives, to smash the Republican forces. Valencia was aban- 
doned and a strategically meaningless battle which would involve a 
bloodbath worse even than those of the Jarama, Brunete and Teruel. 
But Franco thought the losses a reasonable price to pay for the 
annihilation of the Republican army.66 
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Once more, his own staff and his German and Italian advisers were 
dismayed. They pointed out to him that it would be easy to contain 
the Republican advance and attack a now virtually undefended Bar- 
celona.67 He was not interested, much preferring to convert Gandesa 
into the cemetery of the Republican army than to seek a swift and 
imaginative victory." The cost was horrendous on both sides. It was 
not until the end of October, after he had secured substantial supplies 
of German weaponry in return for mining concessions, that Franco 
could launch his decisive counter-offensive. By mid-November, he had 
recovered the territory lost in July. He had side-stepped another chance 
of quick victory and secured what he most wanted-the annihilation 
of the Republican army. There would be no negotiated truces, no 
conditions, no peace with honour. It was effectively the end for the 
Republic. The last push against Catalonia began on 23 December. 
Barcelona fell on 26 January 1939. In Madrid, on 4 March, the 
commander of the Republican Army of the Centre, Colonel Seg- 
ismundo Casado revolted against the Republican government in the 
hope of stopping increasingly senseless slaughter. His hopes of a 
negotiated peace were rebuffed by Franco and, after a minor civil war 
within the civil war, troops all along the line began to surrender. The 
Nationalists entered an eerily silent Madrid on 27 March. On I April 
1939, Franco issued his final victory communique. 
Franco had fought a political war. He had not set out to emulate 
Napoleon. Indeed, he stated often enough his conviction that 'stylish 
military operations' did not serve his purpose. He was almost certainly 
lacking in the vision and the capacity to conceive such operations. His 
talents lay in other directions. He had a remarkable capacity to raise 
the morale of those around him simply by his imperturbability under 
pressure. No reverse affected his equanimity. His ability as a rebel 
general to secure the logistical support of Germany and Italy was 
crucial to the success of his war effort. His success in domesticating 
and unifying the disparate political forces in his coalition was hardly 
less remarkable. These were achievements which outweighed his 
deficiencies as a stylish strategist. In the last resort, his primordial 
concern as a military leader had been to ensure a long future as 
dictator, and his war effort successfully traumatised the defeated into 
long years of apathy. Many of Franco's strategic decisions-Toledo, 
Brunete, Teruel, the Maestrazgo, the Ebro-confirm that he was not 
a great military thinker. Yet each of those decisions brought him nearer 
to his goal. He can hardly be considered a military failure. His strategy 
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was based on an assumption of the primacy of political concerns. His 
war effort was the first and bloodiest stage in a political repression that 
would maintain an intense rhythm of killing until 1943 and never be 
entirely relaxed. Throughout the years following his victory, he rejected 
any thought of amnesty or reconciliation with the defeated. Over four 
hundred thousand Republicans were forced into exile. As many again 
were sentenced to periods in prison, concentration camps or labour 
battalions. Until he died, Franco's regime deliberately kept alive the 
memory of the Civil War and maintained the division between victors 
and vanquished as an instrument of policy.69 His long war was the 
pillar on which his long dictatorship rested. 
69Paul Preston, The Politics of Revenge: Fascism and the Militagy in Twentieth Centugy Spain 
(I990), 30-47. 
